Global Cyber Pulse
Known exploited vulnerabilities from CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. These are not necessarily zero-days and are not evidence that ExoTrade is affected. Applicability requires a confirmed asset inventory.
A zero-day is an unknown or unpatched vulnerability; malware and viruses are malicious software. This is public information, not ExoTrade monitoring or a SIEM system.
Ambient dots are decorative and do not indicate live protection.
FIRST EPSS estimates the daily probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It is a prioritization signal, not a complete risk score. EPSS enrichment is not included here.
Threat feed temporarily unavailable
Last retrieved: unavailable. Last attempted (UTC): . No expired catalog is shown. Please consult the official sources above.
Security promise
ExoTrade aims for high assurance through layered controls that can be inspected, tested and improved. A failure in one control should not automatically become a failure of every boundary. We measure progress through repeatable tests, explicit authorization rules, deployment acceptance criteria and evidence of remediation.
“Current” means a control is implemented in this repository; it does not prove every production setting or provider action. “Planned” and “External” identify work or dependencies that must not be mistaken for active defenses.
The ExoShield seven-layer model
01
Verify Every Identity
Authenticate through Auth0, require verified-email evidence for private API access, and fail closed when identity evidence is missing or malformed. MFA, passkeys and step-up remain configuration-dependent or planned.
02
Grant Minimum Authority
Start new identities as applicants, load approved roles and staff capabilities on the server, separate back-office administration from community membership, and never trust browser-supplied authority.
03
Isolate Every Project
Check active project membership and document scope on the server. Keep public discovery limited to approved, sanitized summaries and keep private collaboration out of public responses.
04
Validate Every Input and File
Validate request schemas and identifiers, apply selective abuse limits, and use file-specific controls. Identity images are decoded and re-encoded; general documents have metadata and access controls but are not malware-scanned.
05
Preserve Tamper-Evident Evidence
Record security-relevant actions with redacted metadata, use revision checks for sensitive decisions, and preserve issued signing artifacts and published governance records. These measures are not a claim of an indestructible or independently verified log.
06
Detect, Contain, and Respond
Use application audit events, bounded errors and a documented incident playbook as a foundation. Central monitoring, managed detection, on-call response and exercised containment require further operational work.
07
Recover, Test, and Improve
Run security regression, authorization, privacy and failure-path tests alongside type and production-build checks. Backup restoration, disaster-recovery exercises and independent testing remain release gates, not current claims.
Current protections
These controls are implemented in source. Their presence does not replace live deployment acceptance or independent assessment.
Informational threat-feed safeguards
CurrentPublic CISA catalog retrieval is bounded, validated, cached and rendered as text with an unavailable fallback. This is informational only, not monitoring, a SIEM system or evidence that ExoTrade is affected.
Auth0 token verification
CurrentPrivate APIs verify Auth0 access tokens with the expected issuer, audience, algorithm and expiry. Missing identity-provider configuration fails closed; provider claim configuration still requires live acceptance.
Verified-email requirement
CurrentPrivate API access requires a verified-email claim. Missing, malformed or unverified identity evidence is rejected rather than treated as authenticated.
Server-side authorization
CurrentApproved roles and staff capabilities are loaded from server-side account records. New identities are applicants by default, and browser-provided roles or user IDs do not grant authority.
Role and admin boundaries
CurrentBack-office administration is distinct from community participation. Limited staff remain capability-scoped, while administrative access does not automatically create project membership.
Project and document isolation
CurrentProject APIs check membership and document scope on the server. Public project discovery uses approved, sanitized summaries rather than private project records.
Trusted-server data boundary
CurrentDatabase migrations deny direct anonymous and ordinary authenticated table access and enable row-level security. Private reads and writes pass through authorized server code; applied production settings still need verification.
Request and schema validation
CurrentRequest bodies use schemas, route identifiers are validated, and JSON routes enforce actual streamed-byte limits rather than trusting a declared size. This does not eliminate every possible malformed-input risk.
Selective application-level throttling
CurrentSome sensitive or public actions have application-level limits. This is not universal, atomic, edge-based rate limiting and does not replace denial-of-service protection.
Identity-image processing
CurrentIdentity uploads are limited to JPEG or PNG, checked for type, size and dimensions, decoded and re-encoded to remove metadata, and stored privately with random keys. This is not antivirus scanning.
Project-file controls
CurrentProject documents use extension, declared-type and size checks, sanitized filenames, random storage keys, scoped authorization and short-lived download links. Uploaded document contents are not malware-scanned.
Integration-specific outbound controls
CurrentThe TelePath integration restricts outbound requests to a fixed HTTPS destination with bounded fetching and redirect rejection. This is not a universal SSRF-control claim for every possible integration.
Audit and revision evidence
CurrentSecurity-relevant workflows record redacted audit metadata; sensitive decisions use revision checks, and issued signing artifacts and published governance records have immutable or append-only behavior.
Explicit API authorization
CurrentPrivate API requests use explicit bearer authorization rather than ambient session cookies. Conventional cookie CSRF is therefore not the primary boundary; XSS and browser-token protection remain important.
Security regression tests
CurrentThe repository includes tests for identity claims, authorization, project isolation, privacy, uploads, stale decisions and failure paths. Local execution is verified; enforced third-party CI gates are not.
Planned, external and independently verified
Planned or configuration-dependent
MFA and step-up authentication
PlannedOptional server policy support exists, but MFA is currently default-off and no enabled tenant policy has been verified. Passkeys and broader step-up coverage are future work.
Backups and tested restoration
PlannedNo backup schedule, completed restore test, recovery-time objective or recovery-point objective is evidenced here. Recovery readiness must be demonstrated before being claimed.
Central monitoring and alerting
PlannedApplication audit and error records exist, but centralized security alerting, exercised escalation and continuous detection coverage are not established.
Dependency, secrets and SAST automation
PlannedDependency scanning, SBOM generation, secrets scanning, security-focused static analysis and enforced security release gates are not evidenced in repository automation.
Documented peer-review and branch gates
PlannedLocal tests and builds are current verification steps. Mandatory peer review, protected branches and externally enforced release policies require separate evidence.
Bug bounty
PlannedA later bounty may be considered after scope, safe-harbor terms, triage capacity and funding are established. No bounty is offered now.
External dependencies
Encryption and browser headers
ExternalHTTPS certificates, HSTS and other browser security headers depend on hosting and edge configuration. Their live settings have not been independently verified in this review.
Global CDN, WAF, DDoS and bot defense
ExternalDistributed edge capacity and bot intelligence require an external network provider and correctly configured deployment. No provider is claimed as active.
Managed SIEM and on-call SOC
ExternalRound-the-clock monitoring, correlation and response require operational people and services beyond application code.
Mature malware scanning and content disarm
ExternalGeneral uploaded files are not malware-scanned. A mature scanning, sandboxing or content-disarm pipeline requires specialized services and safe quarantine design.
Independent penetration testing
ExternalAn independent application and deployment assessment must be completed before sensitive or high-value activity. This source review is not a penetration test.
Independently Verified
No controls are independently verified in this release. No independent penetration test, security audit, certification or vendor-protection verification has been evidenced. The independent-verification register is intentionally empty.
Identity and access
- Current: Auth0-based authentication, verified-email enforcement, server-side token verification and database-backed authorization.
- Current: Applicant-by-default access, separately approved community roles, project membership checks and distinct staff/admin boundaries.
- Planned or configuration-dependent: MFA, passkeys and step-up authentication. Optional policy support is not evidence that a tenant has enabled or tested them.
- Review principle: Administrative authority does not automatically confer community membership, and user-interface visibility is never treated as authorization.
Application and API controls
Request schemas, identifier validation and server authorization are current. Selected workflows have application-level throttles, but ExoTrade does not claim universal or edge rate limiting.
Files are handled by class
Identity images receive specialized decoding and re-encoding. General project documents receive declared-metadata, size, name, authorization and scoped-link controls. Neither statement means uploaded files are malware-scanned.
Outbound requests need explicit boundaries
The current TelePath integration has a fixed-destination HTTPS policy, bounded fetch and redirect rejection. Future integrations need their own SSRF review rather than inheriting this claim automatically.
Browser and request context
Private APIs use explicit bearer authorization instead of ambient session cookies, so conventional cookie CSRF is not the primary boundary. Secure cookies, HSTS, CSP and related response headers remain hosting/configuration concerns where applicable; no strict-CSP claim is made.
Data and project isolation
- Project membership, document scope and back-office permissions are checked by server code. Public summaries are sanitized and separately approved.
- Database migrations enable row-level security and remove direct public table access. Privileged server access still requires correct authorization on every operation; RLS alone is not the whole isolation model.
- Least-privilege service access and private storage boundaries reduce exposure, but applied production policies and storage settings require deployment verification.
- External/configuration-dependent: HTTPS and encryption-in-transit settings are supplied by the hosting and provider path. Their live state is not independently verified here.
- Planned: Backup schedules and restore tests are not evidenced. Do not infer recovery readiness from the existence of a database.
Secure development lifecycle
The near-term verification target is OWASP ASVS 5.0 Level 2, with selected Level 3 controls for admin, contract, future financial, identity and sensitive-document workflows. This is a mapping target, not an ASVS certification or independent assessment.
Review the official OWASP ASVS 5.0 standard| Control | Status | Evidence or gap |
|---|---|---|
| Threat modeling | Current | A high-level trust-boundary, asset, threat and mitigation model is documented. It must be revisited as features and deployment change. |
| Peer review | Planned | A mandatory, documented review policy and branch protection are not evidenced. |
| Automated tests | Current | Unit and regression tests cover security-sensitive rules; the full suite, TypeScript and production build are local release checks. |
| Dependency scanning | Planned | No repeatable repository scanning workflow or reviewed vulnerability baseline is evidenced. |
| Software bill of materials | Planned | A versioned SBOM should be generated and retained for release candidates. |
| Secrets scanning | Planned | Automated history and change scanning is not evidenced. Public configuration must remain distinguishable from credentials. |
| Security static analysis | Planned | Type checking and linting are useful but are not a substitute for security-focused SAST and reviewed findings. |
| Enforced release gates | Planned | Local checks are current; externally enforced CI, approval and deployment policies require separate configuration evidence. |
Monitoring, response and recovery
Current: security-relevant application events and redacted audit metadata provide investigation evidence, unexpected API failures return generic responses, and a minimum incident playbook is documented for maintainers.
Planned: centralized alerting, exercised escalation, managed detection, on-call coverage, recovery objectives and repeated restore exercises. No 24/7 monitoring or recovery-time claim is made.
Response priorities are to protect people, preserve evidence, contain unauthorized access, communicate without speculation, recover deliberately and document corrective action. Reporters and participants can use the existing help-request form; the Help hub explains ordinary account and access issues.
What requires an external service
Application code can enforce identity, authorization and validation, but it cannot credibly recreate global network capacity, independent human review or a staffed security operation by itself.
Global edge CDN, WAF, DDoS and bot intelligence
Distributed networks absorb and filter traffic before it reaches the application. Effective bot defense also requires broad telemetry and continuously tuned detection.
Managed SIEM and on-call SOC
Central correlation, trained responders and continuous escalation require an operating team and tooling beyond a web application.
Mature malware scanning and content disarm
Safe detonation, signature and heuristic coverage, quarantine and document reconstruction require specialized, maintained services.
Independent penetration testing
A credible independent assessment requires a qualified assessor with documented scope, methodology, findings and remediation review.
A later bug bounty
A bounty needs explicit scope, safe-harbor terms, triage capacity and funding. It is not launched by publishing a reporting form.
Vendor-neutral enterprise comparison
Cloudflare, Akamai and AWS are comparison examples only; their inclusion does not assert current use, endorsement or an affiliate relationship. Enterprise pricing is generally quote-based. AWS Shield Advanced publishes a USD 3,000/month base subscription, with a one-year commitment plus usage and support considerations; confirm current terms before budgeting. This is information, not a recommendation to purchase it.
| Evaluation area | Cloudflare Enterprise | Akamai | AWS-native edge |
|---|---|---|---|
| Typical building blocks | CDN, DNS, WAF, DDoS and bot products; exact features depend on contract. | Enterprise delivery, application security and mitigation products; exact bundle depends on contract. | CloudFront, WAF, Shield and related services; architecture and support choices affect coverage. |
| Evaluation fit | Consider when consolidated edge DNS, application delivery and security operations are priorities. | Consider for complex enterprise delivery, existing Akamai operations or specialized service requirements. | Consider for AWS-centered workloads and teams able to operate integrated AWS controls. |
| Commercial approach | Enterprise terms are generally custom; request a written quote and service scope. | Enterprise terms are generally custom; request a written quote and service scope. | Shield Advanced has a public base subscription; usage, support, commitment and other service charges need review. |
| What to test | Origin lock-down, rule tuning, logs, false positives, escalation and portability. | Migration effort, rule operations, logs, service response, integration and portability. | Origin exposure, WAF coverage, support tier, logs, cost drivers and cross-service operations. |
Security roadmap
Phase 1 · Foundation now
Prove the application boundary
Maintain verified identity, least authority, project isolation, validation, audit evidence and regression tests. Document gaps honestly and exercise the incident playbook.
Phase 2 · Before broad beta
Add edge and operational protection
Evaluate and configure managed CDN/WAF/DDoS and bot controls, security headers, central alerting, backup restoration and vulnerability-management automation. Acceptance requires deployment evidence and negative tests.
Phase 3 · Before sensitive or high-value activity
Obtain independent verification
Complete scoped penetration testing, remediate findings, verify identity and document workflows, and rehearse incident and recovery procedures. Selected higher-assurance controls should cover admin, contract, identity and sensitive-document paths.
Phase 4 · When money flows
Continuous assurance
Require stronger authentication and step-up, transaction-specific threat modeling, continuous monitoring, repeatable recovery exercises, dependency/SBOM governance and periodic independent reassessment before enabling financial activity.
Phase 1 remains nonfinancial. Later phases are entry gates, not promises that a date, vendor, assessment or financial feature has already been scheduled.
Report a vulnerability
Use the existing security and help contact path to report a suspected vulnerability. Include the affected public page or workflow, a minimal reproduction, expected and observed behavior, and potential impact. Do not include passwords, tokens, identity documents or another person’s data in the initial report.
- Do not access, change, download or retain another person’s data.
- Do not disrupt service, degrade availability, use social engineering or run high-volume automated testing.
- Stop at the minimum proof needed, preserve confidentiality and give maintainers an opportunity to investigate and remediate.
- For ordinary account or feature questions, start with the Help hub.
No bug bounty is offered yet. Reporting does not create a reward, employment, legal or confidentiality agreement.
Open the help-request form